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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE FOUND BY
MARIJUANA DETECTION DOGS
By: Captain Fredric I. Lederer, AJGC, Fort Gordon, Georgia, and
Second Lieutenant Calvin M. Lederer, QMjJAGC, Hofstra University Law School
Just as the attention of the public has become increasingly centered on the illicit drug
trade so have law enforcement agents intensified their efforts to cope with the traffic. One
of the more effective instruments developed to
detect hidden drugs and deter drug abuse has
been the dog. Dogs 1 have been trained 2
within the Department of Defense 3 to detect
marijuana and heroin. It is the purpose of
this article to discuss in brief the difficulties
such searches raise when the prosecution attempts to have the resulting evidence admitted
at trial and to proffer some suggestions for
both defense and trial counsel involved in a
marijuana 4 dog case. At the outset it should
be noted that there is a paucity of cases involving narcotics detection dogs.n
The typical barracks G dog search approximates the following pattern: A commanderfrequently at brigade level-will arrange for
a detector dog and handler (usually under the
control of the PMO) to search a unit. The
decision to search may be made alone or in
conjunction with a subordinate commander.
The dog and handler are then transported
unannounced to the unit where the barracks
are either emptied of personnel and guards
posted, or the unit members are ordered to
stand by their bunks and lockers. Somewhat
obviously, the former is to be preferred if the
purpose of the search is examination of the
barracks and lockers. The dog is walked
through the barracks guided by the handlerthe importance of whose activities cannot be

overemphasized. The dog should smell everything in its path. While the dog may detect
airborne scent and follow it to its source, more
likely the dog will have to smell the immediate
proximity of an area to detect marijuana
within it. The dog will, when it believes it has
located marijuana, "alert" to the substance by
whining, :pawing the area, trying to play with
the substance, and displaying similar actions.
At this point, the officer accompanying the dog
team will authorize seizure, or in the case of a
container such as a wall locker, will authorize
entry and search.
Two threshold questions present themselves: is the given search one that is dependent upon probable cause for legitimacy
and, if so, who has actually authorized it?
These questions are as old as the law of search
and seizure but pose certain peculiarities in
this context. A search of public property 7
or open fields R does not require probable
cause nor does seizure of contraband found in
plain view. 9 Yet - may a dog be walked
through the middle of a barracks? In the
broadest sense, the question is that of the
reasonable expectation of privacy by the
soldier billeted in the barracks. While he may
not expect a dog, he is well aware that his
quarters are for many purposes public and
open to any member of the command as well
as to numerous visitors. While the situation
may differ slightly where barracks which are
divided into rooms rather than bays, the question is one of degree. It is suggested that
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where the individual has no expectation of
substantial privacy, no cause is necessary to
walk the dog through the area, and any contraband found may be seized. 10 The weight
of the policy behind the military's drug suppression program must be considered to be a
primary factor involved in the determination
not to expand the right of privacy in the military in this setting. Such a determination
has already been signaled by a military
court. 11
On the other hand, intrusion into those
areas normally considered private necessitates
either probable cause or a shakedown inspection theory. Use of a dog would seem to
nullify any attempt at explaining a search as
a traditional shakedown inspection devoted to
a unit's readiness or health and welfare. However, recent case law indicated that a shakedown inspection may ordered for the express
purpose of finding contraband such as illegal
weapons and drugs, 12 and that any contraband seized may be used in subsequent criminal prosecution. Accordingly, if every room
and locker were shaken down as in a normal
shakedown inspection and the dog was used
simply to assist in the shakedown, probable
cause, depending upon what the dog actually
alerts to, might not be necessary to establish
the legality of the search and subsequent
seizure. Assuming that this theory fails or
that the more normal and economical type of
dog search (opening only those lockers and
perhaps entering only those rooms the dog
alerts to from the outside) is used, probable
cause will be necessary 13 to secure admission
of seized evidence at trial.
If probable cause is necessary, the question
of command authorization is raised. In the
typical barracks dog search counsel will note
that a distinct question may be raised as to
which commander actually authorized the
search. If the company commander was
ordered to open any locker the dog alerted to,
it is probable that the superior commander
was the authorizing officer 14 and any foundation to be laid in court to admit the evidence
will, as will be discussed below, have to explore his knowledge of the dog's background.

The issue will be one of the discretion available to the authorizing officer. In dog searches
as in other search cases, the person authorizing a search must have the power to do so.
Practical experience suggests that some commanders may erroneously believe they may
delegate their powers to anyone in a most informal manner when dogs are involved. While
we are unaware of any dog case that involved
search warrants, the question of the ability
of a military judge to authorize search of an
area or a container that a dog alerts to is obvious and of great interest.
The principal question in regard to marijuana dog use is: can a dog alone supply
probable cause to search? When this question
was first posed, the official response was a
conservative (but hedged) no. 15 In light of
recent case law the better answer would seem
to be that the dogs can indeed supply probable
cause. Only three military appellate cases 16
have dealt with the question however briefly
and indirectly. United States v. Unrue involved a marijuana dog search of a vehicle after
it passed a road-block warning of search by
narcotics dogs (an opportunity was supplied
before search to drop any drugs into an "amnesty barrel") .n The dog alerted to the car
and its five occupants were disembarked and
apprehended. Subsequent body searches revealed heroin in the possession of Unrue. The
Court of Military Review held that the dog's
alert was sufficient to supply probable cause
to apprehend. The record of trial 18 indicates
that the Brigade Commander who was held by
the Court to have actually authorized the
search (rather than the Brigade S-2 who was
actually in charge of the operation and search)
had observed the dog in action and was satisfied as to its reliability in the detection of
marijuana. While the difference, if any, between probable cause to apprehend and probable cause to search is unclear in this context
(when the dog's alert indicates the probable
immediate presence of seizable contraband)
and not within the scope of this article, it
seems unlikely that a standard of proof that
justifies such a severe deprivation of liberty
(apprehension) as well as subsequent search
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based on the apprehension would be held less
strict than a standard that justifies only invasion of privacy.
While the Air Force Court of Review in
United States v. Ponder specifically did not
decide the point, it stated (citing Wigmore's
discussion of bloodhound evidence) HI that assuming arguendo a dog could supply probable
cause, the dog would have to be shown to have
been "well trained and well tested." ~ 0 The
Court explicitly noted that a foundation of reliability was required to be shown before the
court could proceed to consider the actual
search. The Court further held that the dog's
reliability had to be made known to the Commander authorizing the search pTior to the
authorization. In Pondet· the Commander's
general knowledge of the dog training program was held insufficient to justify the
search. There is no reason to believe that
knowledge of the mere fact that a dog has
graduated from a military drug detection
course will be held sufficient reason to accept
a dog's reliability without further inquiry. In
concept the closest thing to marijuana dog
searches in prior law has been the use of
bloodhound evidence. In the usual case the
prosecution has sought to use the fact that a
given individual was tracked by a dog to show
the identity of the alleged perpetrator. The
states have split 21 on the admissibility of
such evidence with the majority of the Southern states accepting it. Those states that have
rejected bloodhound evidence seem to have
done so primarily on the grounds that a dog
is inherently unreliable, and/or is in the position of an expert witness who cannot be cross
examined. A distrust of such evidence in view
of the lack of scientific evidence to explain the
sense of smell has also been evidenced. 22 Examination of the cases suggests that the primary reason why states have banned use of
bloodhound evidence has been the fear that it
unduly impresses juries which may rely on it
to deprive a defendant of liberty or life.
While of course the law of search and seizure's
purpose may be said to protect the privacy of
an individual against unreasonable invasion,
clearly the consequences of the use of blood-

hound evidence differ from those surrounding
admission of evidence found by the marijuana
detection dog. In the first, a man's liberty
may depend solely on the actions of a dog that
cannot be examined. In the second, the consequence is simply a breach of privacy that leads
to perfectly good evidence. If sufficient precautions can be taken to prevent unreasonable
breaches of privacy, a balancing between the
right to privacy, particularly as it exists in
the military, 23 against the current necessity
to prevent drug use (particularly heroin traffic) should yield a holding that evidence found
by dogs is admissible. Such a balancing is, in
practical terms, inescapable, and at least one
military trial court has already indicated such
thinking.~ 4 Certainly detection of a drug's
odor by law enforcement agents has long been
considered sufficient to supply probable cause
to search. 25 What is involved here is only the
expansion of the doctrine to a tool of law
enforcement - a tool which experience has
shown, when reasonable precautions are taken,
to be an unusually effective one.
The question must then be: what are reasonable precautions? Such safeguards must
be the laying of a foundation at trial that
shows the dog is in fact reliable and that the
commander or magistrate authorizing the
search was aware prior to authorization of
sufficient facts to convince him of the individual dog's reliability. Such a test is akin
to that necessary to legitimatize a search based
on an informer's testimony or a search based
on a mechanical detection instrument. 26 In
view of the bloodhound cases, it seems unlikely
that a good faith reliance on erroneously
stated evidence of reliability would support
a commander's decision to search.
To support the foundation suggested above,
the following requirements should be met by
commanders or judges before dog searches are
authorized:
(1) the commander or judge should be
briefed in detail as to the general content
of the marijauna detection dog course
with emphasis placed on how the dog
actually detects the drug;
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(2) the commander or judge should be
briefed by the dog handler (who should
keep permanent records to supply the
information) ~ 7 as to the training and
performance of the actual dog to be used
-both before graduation and during subsequent live searches and practices. The
handler should specify reliability in terms
of the type of search (i.e. parcel, building, or vehicle) ;
(3) if another individual is to conduct
the search, instructions should be clear
and preferably written. Where the intent
is simply to send the dogs to a unit to be
used as a subordinate may determine, it
is essential that the subordinate's discretion be indicated.
Counsel must bear in mind that investigation into the facts and background of a dog
search must be thorough. Pitfalls for both
prosecution and defense are numerous. The
percentage reliability quoted by a dog handler
is usually the number of "finds" of planted
marijuana divided by the total number of
"plants". It does NOT indicate the number
of times the dog has falsely alerted in the
absence of the drug. Since the dog will alert
to the smell of a drug that has been removed
from the area (dead scent) the handler may
state that every alert of his dog is to past or
present contraband. For Fourth Amendment
purposes the ability of a dog to detect actual
scent as compared with false alerts may be
vital. The fact that a dog can find only 10 7r
of planted material only indicates that perhaps 90 '/o of contraband holders will escape
detection. Since the fourth amendment protects privacy, one should be more concerned
over how many innocent people will have their
privacy invaded. Thus the percentage of
"true" alerts to total alerts is important. This
area has not been adequately explored in dog
search cases. Similarly, what effect does the
routine alert to dead scent have? Courts that
have considered the question have not apparently directed their attention to this matter
either. 28 If one must have probable cause to
believe that contraband is at a given place
nnw, as current case law requires, what effect
does the dog's possible inability to distinguish
and/or signal dead scent to its handler have?
Counsel should be further cautioned to care-

fully examine the dog's training. A heroin
detection dog, for example, may have been
trained to detect materials used to cut heroin
rather than to detect heroin proper. Every
dog is trained to ignore detractors (i.e. noises,
smells, etc.), artificial detractors (substances
with smells similar to marijuana) and masking agents (substances such as perfume or
gasoline which are used to mask the odor of
the contraband) but the degree to which the
dog has successfully completed such training
will vary with the dog. Dogs generally have
short attention spans and are greatly affected
by certain working conditions. Contact with
a dog's handler is essential to determine a
dog's strengths and weaknesses. At the same
time counsel should inquire into the background of the handler. It is not impossible for
a handler unintentionally or otherwise to cue
his dog to give an alert.
Cases involving dog searches and indeed
cases that involve animals generally may be
expected to occur more frequently in the future. They present a fascinating question as
to the interaction between pressing social
problems and the developing right to privacy.
Footnotes
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

While dogs of many breeds are used, the working
breeds-particularly German Shepherds-seem to
be preferred.
See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL FM 20-20
BASIC TRAINING AND CARE OF MILITARY DOGS
11972); CONARC PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION 830F6: Army RE>g. No. Hl0-12 (17 April 1970); U.S.
ARMY MILITARY POLICE ScHOOL DEP'T OF SPECIALIZED TRAINING, TRAINER'S GUIDE-MARIJUANA DETECTOR DOGS.
Arm~· Marijuana Detection Dogs (MDD) are procured b:v the USAF Base Procurement Office,
Lackland AFB, Texas, and trained for thirteen
weeks at the U.S. Armv Military Police School,
Fort Gordon, GA. Handlers are volunteers from
the 4th AIT Brigade, (MP), Fort Gordon, GA.
Except where otherwise indicated, use of the term
marijuana within this article will include heroin.
Marijuana Detection Dogs without further training are unable to detect heroin.
See United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428
(AFCMR), petition denied,-- U.S.C.M.A. - - ,
45 C.M.R. 928 (1972); United States v. Unrue,
72-16 JALS 3 (ACMR 1972); United States v.
Smith,-- C.M.R. - - (NCMR 1972). Research,

Pam 27-50-4

16
including an Air Force LITE computer search,
has failed to indicate other cases, military or
civilian on point. We believe, however, that anumber of special courts-martial have ruled on dog
searches. See e.g. note 27 infra.
6.

Dogs may be used for virtually any type of search
though the categories of building, vehicle, and
parcel are often used. Believing that building
searches generally present the most problems and
subsume within them the problems presented by
other types of searches, we have chosen to address ourselves only to building searches.

7.

Cf. United States v. Weshenfelder, 20 U.S.C.M.A.
416, 43 C.M.R. 256 (1971); Army Reg. No. 190-22,
para. 2-2(d) (12 Jun 1970).

8.

See e.g. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 152; Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) but see United
States v. Burnside, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 326, 35 C.M.R.
298 (1965). In Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky.
550, 11 S.W. 651 (1889), two policemen were
walking by a building when they heard screams
from inside the building. The policemen rushed inside and arrested the defendant, who had been
beating his mistress. The Court upheld the arrest
on the theory that the offense was committed in
the officer's presence. The Court felt that the information gained through the sense of hearing
justified the intrusion into the building. In Burnside, the Court assumed that the backyard was a
protected curtilag-e but justified the officer's entry
into the backyard on the basis of their plain view
of stolen property in the back yard. Perhaps the
Court would permit an intrusion into a protected
area where the dog's alert in an unprotected, open
area furnishes probable cause to believe that contraband is located in a protected area such as a
footlocker.

9.

See e.g. United States v. Coleman, 32 C.M.R. 522
(ABR 1962).

10. Cf. United States v. Sumner, 34 C.M.R. 850
(AFBR 1964); United States v. Ferrell, 41 C.M.R.
452, 455 (ACMR 1969).
11. See Memorandum Opinion of Colonel Reid W.
Kennedy, Military Judge, in United States v. Unrue, GCM convened by the CG, 197th Infantry
Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia (filed 29 Nov
1971).
12. See Gilligan, Inspections, THE ARMY LAWYER, Vol.
2, No. 11 (Nov 1972) at 11, and cases cited within.
See generally Hunt, Inspections, 54 MIL. L. REV.
225 (1971).
13. Though unlikely in our opinion, we do not foreclose the possibility of a form of implied consent
if members of a unit are given advance warning
of the future use of dogs. Of more interest is the

possibility of apprehension of an individual after
a dog's alert and subsequent search pursuant to
lawful apprehension. Sec United States v. Unrue,
supra note 5.
14. United States v. Unrue, supra note 5, at footnote
3.
15. DAJ A-MJ 1971/9121, 13 Oct. 1971.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. In view of the case's posture, consent to search
was not at issue.
18. Record, pp. 12, 13, United States v. Unrue, 12
Nov 1971, as cited in Government Appellate Reply
Brief. The Army Court of Military Review,
though holding the officer conducting the search
not to be a proper delegatee of the Commander's
power to search, did not discuss this issue in its
opinion.
19. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 177.
20. United States v. Ponder, 45 C.M.R. 428, 434
(AFCMR 1972).
21. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R. 3d 1221 (1968).
22. Query what effect odor detection devices developed
for use in Vietnam may have.
23. See e.g. Ally, Overseas Commander's Power to
Regulate the Private Life, 37 MIL.L.REV. 57
(1967); Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a Private
Life, 24 MIL. L. REV. 97 (1964); Webster, The
Citizen-Soldier in the Age of Aquarius: Does He
Have a Private Life?, 27 JAG. J. 1 (1972).
24. See note 11 supra.
25. See e.g., McNeil, Recent Trends in Search and
Seizw·e, 54 MIL. R. REV. 83, 93 and cases cited at
note 39 (1971).
26. A special court-martial tried at Fort Carson,
Colorado, some two years ago, involved a marijuana dog search of a barracks divided into semiprivate rooms. The dog entered a room and alerted
to a wall locker. The Commander, who had accompanied the search team, authorized search of
the locker. Marijuana was found. The Military
Judge at the subsequent trial denied the defense
motion for appropriate relief to suppress the
marijuana holding that the dog had in effect been
shown to have been a reliable informant giving
probable cause to search. The defendant was
convictod (material courtesy of the Office of the
SJ A, Fort Carson). See also note 11 supra.
27. Army Reg. No. 190-12, para. 3-1 (d)
1970).

(17 April

28. The facts in Unrue did not raise this point directly
as the dog's reaction in that case was shown to be
different to dead scent from its reaction to "live"
scent.

